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BALANCED JUDICIAL REALISM IN THE SERVICE OF
JUSTICE: JUDGE RICHARD D. CUDAHY
Elizabeth Mertz* & Cynthia Grant Bowman**

There is a quiet irony to be found in scholarly writings about the
judiciary, which often center around high-profile jurists selected as the
“great” judges. But there are great judges who do not receive or even
want such widespread recognition, and who do not discuss their philosophy of judging—they simply focus on the job in front of them.
Judges who operate with humility can often be very quiet about their
legacies—brushing the issue off, as if uncomfortable with the attention. Anyone who knew Judge Richard D. Cudahy of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit will recognize this
description. In some ways, that kind of reticence makes writing about
his jurisprudence more than a little challenging. But in other ways, it
invites us to examine what this “judges’ judge” exemplified as he
worked at his craft. In reflecting on this, perhaps we can understand
that craft more deeply.
The scholarly fields of jurisprudence and empirical socio-legal studies1 have long histories of research that speak to the question of what
judges actually do compared to what they should do. It remains
* Research Professor, American Bar Foundation; John & Rylla Bosshard Professor of Law
Emerita, University of Wisconsin Law School; Affiliated Faculty, Department of Anthropology,
University of Wisconsin. Judicial clerk for Judge Richard D. Cudahy 1988–89. I am grateful to
Richard Parmentier for helpful discussions of Peircean theory. We thank our editors at the
DePaul Law Review for their hard work and good feedback, and Brian Tamanaha for his comments on an earlier version of the manuscript.
** Dorothea S. Clarke Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Judicial clerk for Judge Richard D. Cudahy, 1982–83. I am grateful to Robin West for her assistance in the early stages of
this project.
1. By socio-legal studies we mean to indicate the long stream of empirical research done
under the aegis of the law-and-society movement, bridging quantitative, qualitative, and experimental approaches as well as the full range of social science fields. This also includes empirical
research on law done within the distinct social science disciplines, as in legal anthropology, sociology of law, political science studies of courts and other legal phenomena, economic research
on law, psychology of law, and interdisciplinary or area studies fields. Because these fields are
rooted in social science, they tend to produce work that describes and analyzes rather than generating normative recommendations—as one would expect to find the latter in the jurisprudential literature. But certainly empirical research, whether qualitative or quantitative, can reveal
ways that judges’ work may stray far from stated ideals, or conform to those ideals with unexpected results. This can provide important information for normative analyses.
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largely the case that these traditions of research normally do not communicate with each other. Yet we found that both traditions informed
our thinking about the work of Judge Cudahy—indeed, they worked
together with surprising ease. Maybe that is a gift of having both insider perspectives as his former clerks, and outsider perspectives as
scholars assessing his public legacy and his work.
In this Article, we draw on both jurisprudence and socio-legal scholarship to shed light on Judge Cudahy’s approach to the craft of judging, arguing that his decisions emanate from a moderate form of
pragmatism in combination with a serious respect for the rule of law—
all in pursuit of the higher aim of achieving justice. To distinguish this
approach from other forms of judicial pragmatism, we are provisionally labelling Judge Cudahy’s judicial style “balanced realism.”2 We
interpret this kind of realism3 to have a lot in common with judicial
pragmatism, albeit with a few noteworthy differences. In Part I, we
briefly discuss the realist tradition and its connection with pragmatism. Part II contains a further discussion of judicial pragmatism, including its sources in pragmatist philosophy, a description of that
approach, and an introduction to some of the judges and their debates
associated with pragmatism. In Part III, we consider the intersection
of pragmatist and realist traditions in law, concluding that a form of
balanced realism provides a productive meeting point for both empirical and aspirational accounts of judging. Part IV applies the insights
of legal pragmatism and balanced realism to the adjudicative style of
Judge Cudahy, using material from our own experiences as his judicial
clerks as well as from the opinions he authored during those time
periods.
I. REALISM, PRAGMATISM,

AND THE

JUDGE’S ROLE

Legal reasoning has a logic of its own. Its structure fits it to give
meaning to ambiguity and to test constantly whether the society has
come to see new differences or similarities. Social theories and
other changes in society will be relevant when the ambiguity has to
2. Here we follow Brian Tamanaha’s insightful call for a balanced account of judicial style.
See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE REALIST-FORMALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS
IN JUDGING 6–7 (2010). Another plausible suggestion we have received is to call Judge Cudahy
an “idealist pragmatist”—idealist both in the sense of incorporating deference to rules, and in
the sense of holding idealistic aspirations for our system of justice.
3. Tamanaha lists a number of ideas as central to defining realism: a “shared sceptical take on
the role of law in judging,” use of law “as a means to serve social ends,” “the pursuit of social
scientific approaches to law,” efforts to reform legal education so as to “improve legal practice
and judging,” and a progressive political agenda. Id. at 70. As Tamanaha also notes, any definition continues to be disputed because this was a loosely-bound collection of scholars that routinely denied its identity as a group. Id.
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be resolved for a particular case. . . . The words change to receive
the content which the community gives to them. The effort to find
complete agreement before the institution goes to work is meaningless. It is to forget the very purpose for which the institution of legal
reasoning has been fashioned. This should be remembered as a
world community suffers in the absence of law.4
***
Studies consistently demonstrate that the act of judging is influenced by judges’ personal perspectives and experiences. . . . [F]rom
the inception of civil rights legislation, judges in the United States
have demonstrated an unease with affecting social change, based on
the mostly unstated notion with no legal basis that courts should not
change the social status quo absent extraordinary reasons for doing
so. . . . The irony, of course, is that the activist insecurity leads
judges to avoid the full implications of enforcing civil rights statutes
in a way that demonstrates . . . a “troubling lack of allegiance” to
formalistic applications of law.5

In the first quotation above, Edward Levi—arguably a legal realist—pointed out the judiciary’s crucial role in drawing upon societal
changes to give meaning to the words of legal statutes and precedent.
This is the genius of legal reasoning at its best: it balances the weight
of past legal decisions and aspirations for justice against the hurlyburly changes constantly occurring in society. In the second quotation
above, Tanya Kateri Hernández reminds us that judges are themselves
situated as particular members of society with their own prejudices
and taken-for-granted truths. These judges are indeed balancing
norms and social changes, but they do so from positions that may limit
their vision. Hernández begins by pointing to the reluctance of judges
occupying relatively privileged positions to change the status quo—no
matter how unjust that status quo might be. Arguably, if judges were
less insulated from the social injustices on which they must rule, they
might be able to see how far the status quo has departed from larger
principles of justice.
Hernández also draws on a realist tradition, one whose roots reach
back to the realism familiar to Levi, but which has grown quite a bit
since his time. Decades of empirical studies on courts and on law now
generally provide far more sophisticated material than was available
to Levi. That research can be found across the social science disci4. Edward Hirsch Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 573–74
(1948).
5. Tanya Katerı́ Hernández, Comparative Judging of Civil Rights: A Transnational Critical
Race Theory Approach, 63 LA. L. REV. 875, 875–76 (2003) (footnote omitted). In this article,
Hernández builds on the work of John Valery White. See John Valery White, The Activist Insecurity and the Demise of Civil Rights, 63 LA. L. REV. 785 (2003). Both White and Hernández pay
careful attention to available empirical research in building their cases.
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plines, including anthropology, sociology, political science, psychology, and economics. Many of the empirical legal researchers who
took their inspiration from the realists have joined forces under the
banner of the Law & Society Association, which also includes law
professors and other scholars in a truly interdisciplinary mix.6 Others
have formed associations focused on law and economics, or law and
quantitative empirical research.7
Another development in empirical research on law has been a more
concerted effort than was found among the original realists to draw on
social science theory as well as social science methods. Indeed, social
science methods make little sense without careful attention to the
kind of theorizing that gives them meaning.8 In one sense, the Critical
Legal Studies and its allied movements that arose during the 1970s
could be seen as an offshoot of legal realism that took social theory
seriously. In recent years, empirical Critical Race Theory (eCRT) in
law, legal feminists drawing on sociology, and others have begun combining insights derived from critical theory with empirical research in
new and exciting ways.9 Hernández’s work is an example of this
promising trend. Scholars working at the intersection of empirical research and social theory—especially on issues of race—are shedding
light on the mistakes that can follow from a limited view of law that
omits perspectives from across a full range of experiences. For example, judges and legislators may attempt to develop legal remedies to
address racial injustice without an adequate understanding of the reality they seek to address. It may now be possible to prevent such mistakes using empirical research designed with a sophisticated sense of

6. The law-and-society movement spans a number of different parts of the world, and includes
associations in multiple countries in addition to the United States.
7. The latter commonly calls itself “empirical legal studies”—a somewhat misleading name
given that it omits a great deal of empirical research of the non-quantitative variety. See generally Mark Suchman & Elizabeth Mertz, Toward a New Legal Empiricism: Empirical Legal Studies and New Legal Realism, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 555 (2010). Suchman and Mertz also
discuss the New Legal Realist (NLR) movement, but we here subsume that under the law-andsociety movement, with which NLR explicitly claims an alliance.
8. 8 In most social sciences, methods are developed in conversation with, and in response to,
theory.
9. See generally Devon W. Carbado & Daria Roithmayr, Critical Race Theory Meets Social
Science, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 149 (2014) (thoughtfully reviewing this emerging field).
See also Laura Gómez, A Tale of Two Genres: On the Real and Ideal Links Between Law and
Society and Critical Race Theory, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 453
(Austin Sarat ed., 2004); Osagie K. Obasogie, Foreword: Critical Race Theory and Empirical
Methods, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 183 (2013).
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all possibilities. This is where drawing on critical theory as well as rich
interdisciplinary perspectives can be of help.10
In recent years, scholars calling for a “New Legal Realism” (NLR)
have advocated for the use of theory-guided research from across the
social sciences to address legal problems.11 Keenly aware of the difficulties of moving between the “is” of social science to the “ought” of
law and policy, NLR scholars are pursuing work that actively “translates” between these two very different approaches.12 They urge lawyers and social scientists alike to be aware of the different goals and
norms guiding their respective enterprises. Lawyers quite reasonably
have to work with the best available information, even with known
flaws, while social scientists prefer to continue their research projects
until they can be certain of both what they know and what they do not
know about a topic. Lawyers may become irritated by the ongoing
nitpicking and declarations of uncertainty that characterize the best
empirical research, while social scientists may find the crude use of
their nuanced conclusions by lawyers offensive. Yet it is an abdication
of responsibility to simply throw up our hands. How can judges make
the best use of the available knowledge from social science?
Hanoch Dagan, writing on this question, has boiled down the tensions between law and social science into three main axes: power versus reason, science versus craft, and tradition versus progress.13 His
compelling version of the legal realist project urges a form of translation between law and social science that takes seriously law’s need to
balance: (1) the external stresses of social power against the internal
integrity of legal reasoning; (2) the external vision of social conflicts
provided by social science against the internal craft of lawyering; and
(3) the external push of social change against the internal roots pro10. It is also where qualitative research can make one of its strongest contributions. Qualitative work, including ethnographic research, is sometimes characterized by quantitative scholars
as “exploratory” or “hypothesis-generating” work—but its import can go far beyond those roles,
depending on the disciplinary frame that is being invoked.
11. See generally Howard Erlanger et al., Forward: Is It Time for a New Legal Realism? 2005
WIS. L. REV. 335 (2005); Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism:
Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (2009). See also
THE NEW LEGAL REALISM, VOLUME I: TRANSLATING LAW-AND-SOCIETY FOR TODAY’S LEGAL
PRACTICE (Elizabeth Mertz et. al. eds., 2016); Stewart Macaulay & Elizabeth Mertz, New Legal
Realism and the Empirical Turn in Law, in INTRODUCTION TO LAW & SOCIAL THEORY 195
(Reza Banakar & Max Travers eds., 2013); Stewart Macaulay, Contracts, New Legal Realism,
and Improving the Navigation of The Yellow Submarine, 80 TULANE L. REV. 1161 (2006).
12. See HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM & RETHINKING PRIVATE LAW THEORY (2013); TRANSLATING THE SOCIAL WORLD FOR LAW (Elizabeth Mertz et. al.
eds., 2016); Stewart Macaulay, New Legal Realism: Unpacking a Proposed Definition, 6 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 149 (2016).
13. DAGAN, supra note 12, at 15.
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vided by legal precedent, rule, and tradition. Stewart Macaulay similarly stresses the importance of including a legal perspective as well as
wisdom from the social sciences when attempting any marriage of law
and social science:
Legal scholars may well bring something from their culture to the
social science approach to legal topics. Holding a Ph.D. does not
free a scholar from the risk of reading, say, a statute literally without an appreciation of the context and traditions that give its terms
meaning. . . . And lawyers often combine a confusing mixture of
being ready to fight for a principle and a real skill in finding an
acceptable compromise that they can sell to opposing parties. They
may offer language that is more suited to calm angry partisans than
to convey unpleasant truths. . . . Finally, legal questions usually involve normative issues based in the culture in question, and law frequently reflects the conflicting norms within a society. Just getting
the facts straight will not necessarily solve every problem.14

Dagan and Macaulay, along with many of the new legal realists, take
legal doctrines and processes seriously even if they do not accurately
reflect what actually happens when laws “hit the ground.”
This approach found powerful expression in Patricia Williams’s classic defense of formal rights against attacks by critical legal studies theorists. These theorists, like many social scientists, tended to focus on
the abuses of power and not the potential for justice behind the legal
doctrines that enshrine such rights:
To say that blacks never fully believed in rights is true. Yet it is also
true that blacks believed in them so much and so hard that we gave
them life where there was none before; we held onto them, put the
hope of them into our wombs, mothered them and not the notion of
them. And this was not the dry process of reification, from which
life is drained and reality faces as the cement of conceptual determinism hardens round—but its opposite. . . . It is true that the constitutional foreground of rights was shaped by whites, parcelled out
to blacks in pieces, ordained from on high in small favors, random
insulting gratuities. Perhaps the predominance of that imbalance
obscures the fact that the recursive insistence of those rights is also
defined by black desire for them. . . . “Rights” feels new in the
mouths of most black people. It is still deliciously empowering to
say. It is the magic wand of visibility and invisibility, of inclusion
and exclusion, of power and no power. The concept of rights, both
positive and negative, is the marker of our citizenship, our relation
to others.15
14. Macaulay, supra note 12, at 152. Frank Cross makes a similar point from a somewhat
different angle. Frank Cross, The New Legal Realism and Statutory Interpretation, 1 THEORY &
PRAC. LEGIS. 129 (2013).
15. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 163–64 (1992).
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This passage speaks directly and powerfully to a core jurisprudential
dilemma. However, disappointingly, Williams’s work and other relevant writings by scholars of color do not get incorporated into the
legal theoretical discussions that aim to define rights and solve the
formalist-realist tension. Hopefully the new legal realism and other
contemporary movements will propel “traditional” legal theorists at
last to consider and incorporate the wisdom found in critical scholarship that by any measure should be considered “legal theory.”16
Narrower definitions of a new legal realist enterprise can also be
found in the literature. Legal scholars Cass Sunstein and Tom Miles,
for example, confine their realist work to quantitative studies of behavior, including judicial behavior.17 Closely allied work on “behavioral law-and-economics” draws on cognitive psychology and
behavioral economics in an effort to correct for the more negative
view of human beings promulgated by the classical law-and-economics
“rational actor” model that frequently overestimated both the selfishness and the self-control of the average person.18 Instead, the newer
and more psychologically-accurate approach advocated by behavioral
law-and-economics scholars considers the irrational, altruistic, and
emotionally-based aspects of human behavior.
However, Daniel Farber comments that “[l]ike rational choice theory, the behavioralist approach also tends to slight the rich institutional settings of most legal problems.”19 Farber urges today’s legal
16. By this we mean the critical legal scholarship that draws on generations of writings by
those “outsiders” who have experienced law in different ways than have the more privileged
sectors of society. Another source of broader, alternative hypotheses and perspectives lies in the
work of social scientists. At their best, the social sciences provide a check on the imposition of
socially-skewed perspectives by requiring that scholars go out into the world and test their ideas
against empirical reality—particularly through the use of observational methods that allow what
is actually happening on the ground to generate ideas and hypotheses for further study, rather
than developing and testing (or merely theorizing about) concepts that do not connect meaningfully with many of laws’ subjects’ actual lives. See also Jonathan Yovel & Elizabeth Mertz, The
Role of Social Science in Legal Decisions, in THE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND SOCIETY 410, 410–11
(Austin Sarat ed., 2004) (outlining institutional tensions that complicate translation of social science for law, including role of expertise in democracy, metascientific tensions, scientific institutional tensions, and problems resulting from infiltration of legal doctrine by a particular social
scientific approach).
17. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, ,75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831
(2008). See also Frank Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 251 (1997).
18. See, e.g., Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and
the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003); Christine Jolls, Behavioral Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 115 (Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2007); see also Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, & Richard Thaler,
A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STANFORD L. REV. 1471 (1998).
19. Daniel Farber, Toward a New Legal Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 281 (2001) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (2000)).
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scholars to follow the lead of the original realists, who “incorporated
the social sciences of sociology, anthropology, psychology, and political science,” as well as economics, into their efforts to improve our
understanding of law.20 In keeping with “big tent” new legal realists
of today, Farber notes that “[i]t may be more fruitful in the long run
. . . to define the project [of a new legal realism] broadly as deepening
the understanding of legal problems through using the models and
methods of the [full range of] social sciences.”21 Along with Laura
Kalman, John Henry Schlegel, and Brian Tamanaha, Farber documents a clear legacy of concern with interdisciplinary perspectives on
law that dates back to the original realists.22
In our analysis of the jurisprudence of Judge Cudahy, we follow the
broader approach to an interdisciplinary new legal realism advocated
by scholars who share a big tent view of the enterprise.23 This broader
approach permits us to incorporate the perspectives of Hernández,
Williams, and other critical theorists along with the findings of the
empirically oriented socio-legal tradition. We also follow these “big
tent” scholars in their turn to pragmatism as a philosophical and epistemological foundation for work that integrates social science and law.
II. JUDICIAL PRAGMATISM
Pragmatism arose as a reaction to positivism and its search for abstract, universal truths. Americans credited with developing this new
20. Id. at 302, n.67.
21. Id. at 303. By “big tent,” Farber refers to the NLR approach of including a wide range of
social sciences and empirical methods rather than focusing on one or two.
22. Daniel A. Farber, Back to the Future? Legal Scholarship in the Progressive Era and Today,
100 MINN. L. REV. 1, 19, 21 (legal realists’ belief that law professors “would need interdisciplinary knowledge” and a keen understanding of that knowledge to achieve an adequate basis of
social and industrial relations needed to create and administer law for new eras intelligently).
See also LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960 (1986); JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995); TAMANAHA, supra
note 2, at 88 (all documenting the view of the vast majority of scholars—and especially those
trained as historians, using in-depth examination of the historical record—that a central legal
realist concern was to harness the social sciences in order to improve law). In another article,
Farber critiques Richard Posner’s claim to be a pragmatist because Posner relies on abstract
economic theories while “seem[ing] relatively uninterested in rigorously testing economic theory
against reality,” as an actual pragmatist would want to do. Daniel A. Farber, Parody Lost/Pragmatism Regained: The Ironic Case of the Coase Theorem, 83 VA. L. REV. 397, 427 (1997). Farber also points out that, contra the standard law-and-economics vision, both Coase and the
pragmatists, along with feminist and other critical theorists, understand humans as fundamentally social beings rather than as extreme individualists. While our analysis of Judge Cudahy’s
decisions points to pragmatist elements in his jurisprudence, we distinguish his approach from
Judge Posner’s in our identification of Judge Cudahy’s larger project as a balanced realist (in the
terms laid out within this Article).
23. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text (referencing scholars).
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approach, such as Charles Sanders Peirce and William James, interacted with Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. at meetings of the Metaphysical
Club in 1872.24 Peirce, a scientist and philosopher, is credited with
having developed a notion of human inquiry as a mode of activity
adaptively produced through biological and cultural evolution.25 That
is, thought is an adaptive function of the human organism, a kind of
evolved problem-solving mechanism embodied in inherited practices
and then modified to meet the needs of humans at a particular time
and in a particular context. Thus, intellectual inquiry for the
pragmatists is a social activity which is contextual, situated, instrumental, and embedded in the conditions of real life.26 In this view, the
collective work of scientists gets incrementally better over time, approaching, if not perfectly capturing, reality. Peirce and William
James, a philosopher and psychologist, challenged the idea that any
sort of absolute truth was possible; at the same time, they rejected
radical skepticism, which denies the possibility of any form of truth at
all.27 Rather, truth for the pragmatists was always tentative, a belief
formed as a result of the best sort of scientific inquiry available at that
time.28 In Peirce’s philosophy, external reality exists apart from
human attempts to grasp it, and we approximate truth through the
ever-improving knowledge generated via the consensus of scientific
communities. Later, the philosopher John Dewey applied these insights to social and educational theory, as well as to politics and law.29
This evolutionary, fallibilistic notion of knowledge and belief contrasted with the accepted foundations of American jurisprudence at
that time, best known in the formalism of Dean Langdell at Harvard
24. Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 864 (1989); Catharine Wells Hantzis, Legal Innovation Within the Wider Intellectual Tradition: The Pragmatism of
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 82 NW. U. L. REV. 541, 545 (1988). See also LOUIS MENAND, THE
METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF IDEAS IN AMERICA 201 (2001).
25. Grey, supra note 24, at 796–97.
26. Id. at 799–802.
27. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Pragmatism in U.S. Legal Theory: Its Application to Normative
Jurisprudence, Sociolegal Studies, and the Fact-Value Distinction, 41 AM. J. JURIS. 315, 326–27
(1996).
28. See Wells Hantzis, supra note 24, at 551–52. Wells Hantzis takes seriously the affinities
between Peirce and Justice Holmes, while not claiming any causal relationship—citing also the
work of Max Fisch, Rand Rosenblatt, and Marcia Speziale. Id. at 545–46 (citing Max Fisch, Was
There a Metaphysical Club in Cambridge?, in STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE 3 (Edward Moore & Richard Robin eds., 1964)). See also M. H. Fisch, Justice
Holmes, The Prediction Theory of Law, and Pragmatism, 39 J. OF PHIL. 85 (1942); Note, Holmes,
Peirce, and Legal Pragmatism, 84 YALE L.J. 1123 (1975); Marcia J. Speziale, By Their Fruits You
Shall Know Them: Pragmaticism and the Prediction Theory of Law, 9 MANITOBA L.J. 29
(1978–1979).
29. See, e.g., MENAND, supra note 24, at 235–37.
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Law School.30 The legal formalists, like the logical positivists, believed that it was possible to discern certain foundational doctrines, or
truths, from which the law could, and should, be derived by a process
of deduction.31 Thus, adjudication was a simple process of discerning
the immutable principle and then applying it, deductively, to the facts.
It was this approach that Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. challenged with
his famous statement that “[t]he life of the law has not been logic, it
has been experience.”32
Holmes has been seen by many legal scholars as having introduced
pragmatism into law, its study, and adjudication33—although there has
been some debate on this point. For example, Heidi Feldman recently
nominated Benjamin N. Cardozo as the true father of pragmatism in
the U.S. legal tradition, challenging accepted wisdom and indeed reviving older arguments about whether Holmes was a pragmatist at
all.34 She based her argument on the famous set of cases loved by all
teachers of torts, Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, decided in 1927
by then-Justice Holmes35 and Pokora v. Wabash Ry., decided in 1934
by then-Justice Cardozo.36 The two cases, coming before the Supreme
Court a mere seven years apart, involved very similar facts; in each, a
motorist was killed or injured by a train at a railroad crossing. The
issue was what the standard of negligence should be in such a case,
and who should decide: the judge or the jury. Holmes saw the standard of care as a rule of law to be determined by the judge in the first
instance and then applied in a uniform fashion in all future cases.37
Cardozo, by contrast, saw the question of negligence as an issue that
depended heavily upon the context and thought that it therefore
should, like most questions of negligence, be given to the jury.38 In
this sense, Feldman argued, Cardozo was the truer pragmatist, favoring judgments reached through collective deliberation within a structured social practice and embracing a fallibilistic notion that there was
30. Grey, supra note 24, at 816–25.
31. Id. at 822.
32. O. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
33. See, e.g., David Luban, What’s Pragmatic about Legal Pragmatism?, 18 CARDOZO L. REV.
43, 53, 61–62 (1996).
34. Heidi Li Feldman, Cardozo Not Holmes, Fallibilism Not Skepticism, Pragmatism Not Legal Realism (Feb. 16, 2012) (working paper) (on file with author). Earlier arguments against
Holmes as a legal pragmatist focused some of his statements expressing negative sentiments
towards at least some forms of pragmatism as well as the inchoate nature of the pragmatism that
appeared in his writings. See generally Grey, supra note 24, at 788–90, 864–70. See also H.L.
POHLMAN, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES AND UTILITARIAN JURISPRUDENCE (1984).
35. 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
36. 292 U.S. 98 (1934).
37. Goodman, 275 U.S. at 70.
38. Pokora, 292 U.S. at 101–02.
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no one answer to the question of negligence in this situation; it could
vary from case to case.39 In Feldman’s view, Cardozo’s pragmatism
may also explain the curious fact that he explicitly did not overrule
Holmes’s decision in Goodman, betokening perhaps an incremental
notion of knowledge as well as respect for his predecessor on the Supreme Court.40
Cardozo’s Nature of the Judicial Process was delivered as a series of
four lectures at Yale before its publication in 1921; here he addressed
the question of what a judge does when he decides a case.41 To this
Cardozo gave an extensive answer, beginning by describing the
“stream of tendency”—the instincts, traditions, acquired convictions,
and the like, from which each human being in the position of a judge
begins.42 He proceeded to discuss what he believed to be important
sources of the law: (1) logic or analogy, (2) history or evolution, (3)
custom, and (4) the welfare of society.43 Only the first source would
conform with the standard assumptions of the case law method as
taught in law school, under which the student seeks to find the principle underlying previous cases and then applies it by analogy to new
situations. In the main, Cardozo thought that judges should adhere to
precedent, in part because it gives the law coherence, consistency, and
predictability.44 Principles, however, only take the judge so far; they
can be expanded to the limit of their logic but are confined in many
cases to their historical context and the need to be capable of evolution.45 In regards to the second source of law, he declared in true
pragmatist fashion that “[t]he rules and principles of case law have
never been treated as final truths, but as working hypotheses, continually retested in those great laboratories of the law, the courts of jus39. Feldman, supra note 34, at 13–14.
40. Id. at 14.
41. Id. at 10.
42. Id. at 12.
43. Cardozo describes these as part of a “line of logical progression” along which “the directive force of a principle” moves, denominating them respectively the methods of philosophy
(analogy), evolution (history), tradition (customs) and sociology (social welfare and justice). Id.
at 65–66. This last “method of sociology” he later associates with “social justice,” the “welfare of
society,” and also “social welfare” (under which he covers “many concepts more or less allied”).
Id. at 62, 67–68. He also lists “equity and fairness” as aspects of social welfare. Id. at 113. At
another point Cardozo elaborates on his basic four-point structure, breaking the final point
down into “utility, and the accepted standards of right conduct” in the section of the book which
discusses the method of sociology, id. at 111–12, while elsewhere he describes the “prevailing
standard of right conduct” as the point at which the methods of tradition and of sociology overlap and meet. Id. at 59–60.
44. See, e.g., id. at 67, 112.
45. Id. at 51, 113.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\67-4\DPL409.txt

666

unknown

Seq: 12

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

8-MAY-18

13:56

[Vol. 67:655

tice.”46 Third, custom is another source of law available to the judge,
but he (always a male at that time) must choose among customs and
traditions in many cases. Fourth, “[t]he final cause of law is the welfare of society.”47 In sum, Cardozo concluded, “logic, and history, and
custom, and utility, and the accepted standards of right conduct, are
the forces which singly or in combination shape the progress of the
law.”48
Both because the law must change to fit the social and economic
needs of the time and because statutes tend to leave gaps that must be
filled by the courts, judges must often function, in Holmes’s description, as “interstitial legislators.”49 How, then, as the realists argued, is
the law not simply subject to the arbitrary wishes of the judge? Cardozo’s answer lay in the individual judge’s professional standards,
study, personality, and experience of life.50 The judge was an individual with a particular perspective, formed by all of these influences.
However, he was called upon to reach his judgments based not on his
own convictions but upon “what fair and reasonable men, mindful of
the habits of life of the community, and of the standards of justice and
fair dealing prevalent among them, ought in such circumstances to do,
with no rules except those of custom and conscience to regulate their
conduct.”51 This is a difficult task, especially in a diverse nation with
competing interests and priorities. But Cardozo believed that “[t]he
training of the judge, if coupled with what is styled the judicial temperament, will help in some degree to emancipate him from the suggestive power of individual dislikes and prepossessions” and “help to
broaden the group to which his subconscious loyalties are due.”52 Except for some who may still embrace the total skepticism of some legal
realists and early scholars in the Critical Legal Studies movement,
Cardozo’s vision remains an aspiration. Yet many modern scholars,
particularly those of race and gender studies, are skeptical of this vision as idealistic; and many, like Professor Hernández, urge the need
to broaden the group from which judges are drawn in order to make
them more inclusive in their vision of the public good.53 Others in the
46. Feldman, supra note 34, at 23.
47. Id. at 66.
48. Id. at 112.
49. Id. at 69–70. See also Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1653, 1658 (1990).
50. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 161–63 (1921). See
also Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 11 (1996); William
Andrew Shutkin, Pragmatism and the Promise of Adjudication, 18 VT. L. REV. 57, 66 (1993).
51. CARDOZO, supra note 50, at 142–43.
52. Id. at 176.
53. Hernández, supra note 5.
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critical, pragmatist, and social science traditions have adopted or
urged adoption of methods to reconsider and widen situated perspectives. These methods would permit social scientists, legal scholars,
judges, and others to, at least partially, bracket their preconceptions in
order to improve understanding of different possible frameworks for
interpreting the social events with which they must deal in their professional lives.
Dewey’s 1924 essay, Logical Method and Law, was consistent with
Cardozo’s philosophy of adjudication, although Dewey repeatedly
cited the writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.54 Logic, Dewey
pointed out, was not purely deductive but rather “empirical and concrete,”55 and scientific method proceeded by investigation, hypothesis,
confirmation, constant retesting, and revision in the face of further
evidence or analysis.56 Thus, logic was always relative to consequences.57 Dewey, therefore, criticized jurisprudence that rested on
formal logic and consistency irrespective of the consequences of applying principles to real people and real world problems.58 Legal rules
in fact function as “working hypotheses, needing to be constantly
tested by the way . . . they work out in application to concrete situations.”59 Whatever law or concept works well in one century may not
in another.60 Thus, Dewey ended his essay with a plea for a more
experimental and flexible logic in law.61 At the same time, he cautioned that legal rules should not be changed except where the circumstances required. Society needed as much certainty and
predictability as possible, but total stability was only possible where
social conditions remained the same.62
In contrast to Feldman’s argument, legal theorist Thomas Grey and
others, like Dewey, have turned to Holmes as a key source for their
conception of legal pragmatism. And indeed, Grey uses Dewey and
neo-pragmatist scholars like Richard Rorty to illuminate the pragmatist in Holmes. As Grey noted,
My thesis is that while there are indeed multiple and apparently
clashing strands in Holmes’ thought, most of them weave together
reasonably well when seen as the jurisprudential development of
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See, e.g., John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 20–21 (1924).
Id. at 19.
Id. at 18–19.
Id. at 19–20, 26.
Id. at 20–22.
Id. at 26.
Dewey, supra note 54, at 27; see also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
Dewey, supra note 54, at 27.
Id. at 24–25.
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certain central tenets of American pragmatism. Conflicts do remain
. . . but they can be explained by a characteristic paradox—the man
was disabled by temperament, by experience, and by the historical
context in which he found himself from adequately practicing the
pragmatism he so eloquently preached.63

Grey identified three primary facets of Holmes’s approach that mark
it as pragmatic. First, Holmes viewed legal inquiry as combining situated or historical perspectives with analytical ones, challenging the division between doctrine and fact—and thus echoing Peirce’s insistence
on moving beyond a simplistic division between deductive and inductive modes, via a kind of reasoning that Peirce called “abduction.”64
While experience may be the life of the law, Holmes recognized that
law also requires some continuing efforts at systematicity and generalization marshalled with an eye to results, i.e., instrumentalism.65 This
leads to Grey’s second point, that Holmes was a pragmatist in this
“practical approach to legal ‘logic,’ or doctrinal conceptualism.”66
And finally, Grey claims Holmes as a pragmatist because Holmes
viewed legal reasoning through the eyes of practicing lawyers attempting to predict how judges would rule in individual cases.67
In her important work on Holmes’s pragmatism, Wells (Hantzis)
provides a vastly different reading of Holmes’s decision in Baltimore
& Ohio R.R. v. Goodman than Feldman, noting:
[Holmes] does not use abstract legal reasoning in his decision; he
merely makes the common sense observation that it is the motorist
who must stop for the train . . . . [He] does not frame the issue as a
two-fold problem in which fact and value are distinct such as: 1)
what does the law . . . require; and 2) do the facts show that this
requirement was met. Instead, he expresses himself in terms that
defy an easy separation between fact and value. . . . [H]is judicial
technique is plainly consistent with his view . . . that the decision in
the individual case comes first while abstract normative principles
63. Grey, supra note 24, at 788; Thomas C. Grey, Judicial Review and Legal Pragmatism, 38
WAKE FOREST. L. REV. 473 (2003). Of interest to our discussion of Cardozo in comparison with
Holmes is Grey’s quotation from Cardozo, who deeply admired Holmes’s famous comment that
experience trumps logic when dealing with law; of that comment, Cardozo said “Here is the text
to be unfolded. All that is to come will be development and commentary.” Grey, supra note 24,
at 792 (quoting Benjamin N. Cardozo, Mr. Justice Holmes, in MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE
SUPREME COURT 3 (Felix Frankfurter ed., 1931)).
64. Grey, supra note 24, at 836–837. As Wells Hantzis explains, the concept of abduction is
quite complex but it exists as a category that is neither purely deductive nor purely inductive—
just as for Holmes the process of legal generalization is neither purely based in principles nor in
facts: “For both Peirce and Holmes, then, generalizations have their origin in the observation of
individual cases”—but the observations or “facts” themselves are already interpreted through
pre-formed conceptualizations or working hypotheses. Wells Hantzis, supra note 24, at 570, 555.
65. See Grey, supra note 24.
66. Id. at 837.
67. Id. at 836–37.
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are only formulated in the context of a later analysis of the results in
individual cases.68

Wells (Hantzis) compares this approach to the mixed/abductive approach of Peirce, and also connects it with a theory of embeddedness
whereby judges reach appropriate results through connecting facts
and values:
[A] judge is able to reach an appropriate result in the individual
case whether or not she is able to articulate any general moral or
legal principles relevant to the case. Her result in the case arises
from an interconnected theory of fact and value which may be approximately reconstructed by examining [their] decisions in a number of cases, but which is never entirely severable from the ongoing
process of adjudication.69

It is both the case that the “received legal tradition” shapes judges’
understanding of cases by providing “the possible frameworks” for interpretation, and also that within those frameworks judges decide
based on rich, deeply embedded responses to the particulars of each
case.70 For Wells (Hantzis), it is easy to reconcile Cardozo’s decision
in Pokora with Holmes’s decision in Baltimore & Ohio R.R. by alluding to the different factual and surrounding social situations. In both
cases, the judges were moving fluidly between legal principles and the
particulars given by the social and factual situations.71 Wells (Hantzis)
points out that the latter, more intuitive part of judging is, as in the
Hernández quote above, subject to all the problems and prejudices of
a particular judge’s own experience.72
In this sense, Holmes’s focus on context exposes a weakness that his
version of pragmatism alone cannot fix: the limits set on the life of the
law by the fact that judges are human and potentially blinded by the
limited character of their own experiences. In later work, Wells addresses this in her analysis of “situated decisionmaking”:
The recognition that legal judgments are situated is the first step
towards an authentic ideal of fairness. If our judgment is inevitably
limited by our perspective, the consideration of the character of that
perspective is the beginning of rational inquiry. The point of this
inquiry is a form of justice that is not rooted in images of detach68. Wells Hantzis, supra note 24, at 572–73.
69. Id. at 573.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 574 (“Not even a full statement by the judge of which facts are relevant and which
are not would enable a subsequent judge or a legal scholar to unpack fully the legal or moral
principles that lurk behind the judge’s decision.”). See also Catharine Pierce Wells, Holmes on
Legal Method: The Predictive Theory of Law as an Instance of Scientific Method, 18 S. ILL. U. L.
J. 329, 345 (1994) (finding Holmes’s views as representing a “moderate position” between formalism and realism).
72. Wells Hantzis, supra note 24, at 594.
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ment and remoteness. Rather it is contained in two related commitments: first, a commitment to be scrupulously honest about the
limits of one’s own particular viewpoint, and, second, a commitment
to be genuinely open to understanding and respecting the viewpoints of others. . . . To honor [these commitments], . . . we must
abandon the pretense that our methods of analysis are universally
correct . . . .73

This is a call to a form of humility that is important as a part of any
ethically responsible legal method.74 Here, Wells’ position connects
well with the work of empirical methodologists who feel it is important to state the limitations of their approaches, and the ways the situated character of their work—whether qualitative or quantitative—
affects what they do and do not capture. It also connects with the
insights of critical race and feminist scholars who document and theorize how gender and race affect the frames of interpretation created
by institutions, including legal institutions, and imposed on “traditional outsiders.”75
In any case, most would agree that Holmes and Cardozo both made
important contributions to a tradition rooted in pragmatism within
U.S. law. That pragmatist tradition also connects with legal realism.76
To the degree that judges relied on more formalist readings of legal
rules, declining to look outside of the doctrines themselves, both legal
pragmatism and legal realism pushed the judiciary to broaden its vision.77 The pragmatists, building from a theory of truth as tentative,
73. Catharine Wells, Situated Decisionmaking, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1727, 1746 (1990).
74. One of us has argued elsewhere that standard legal reasoning as it is taught in United
States law schools has what might be termed a humility deficit—that is, it does not encourage
incipient lawyers to seek and acknowledge limitations built into legal approaches. ELIZABETH
MERTZ, LAW SCHOOL LANGUAGE: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER” (2007).
75. Catharine Wells, Why Pragmatism Works for Me, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 347 (2000). For a
few of the many writings on these topics, see CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, LAURA A. ROSENBURY, DEBORAH TUERKHEIMER, AND KIMBERLY YURACKO, FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: CASES
AND METHODS (4TH ED., 2010); CRENSHAW, KIMBERLÉ, NEIL GOTANDA, GARY PELLER, AND
KENDALL THOMAS, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (1995); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2005); GABRIELLE GUTIÉRREZ Y MUHS, YOLANDA FLORES NIEMANN, CARMEN
GONZÁLEZ, AND ANGELA HARRIS, PRESUMED INCOMPETENT: THE INTERSECTIONS OF RACE
AND CLASS FOR WOMEN IN ACADEMIA (2012); WILLIAMS, supra note 15; Carbado and
Roithmayr, supra note 9; Martha A. Fineman, Feminist Legal Theory, 13 J. GENDER, SOC. POL.
& L. 13 (2005); Gómez, supra note 9; Obasogie, supra note 9; Ann Scales, The Emergence of
Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986). W.E.B. Du Bois’s The Souls of
Black Folk (1903) was an early, powerful effort at reframing dominant understandings of the
experience of race and racism in the United States.
76. There are also, perhaps predictably, debates over this relationship.
77. We write “to the degree” here because we are convinced by writers attacking the standard
narratives about these supposedly “opposed” schools of thought that things are actually much
more complicated. See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, supra note 2; Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s
Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983). Formalists were generally not as dense about law in
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believed in the possibility of an inquiry resulting in the best possible
approximation of truth available at a particular time and place. Although this inquiry was not completely objective, because it was carried out by human beings with perspectives formed by their life
contexts, it was nonetheless not entirely subjective either.78 The training and professional ethics of judges, as well as the necessity of giving
reasoned explanations of their holdings, arguably—in the best-case
scenario—could help constrain them from making simply ad hoc decisions. The kind of pragmatism described by Wells, drawing on Peirce
and Holmes, could push judges to admit the limitations of their own
perspectives and to examine their situatedness. Because it embraced
social science inquiry, legal realism encouraged judges to rely not only
on their own intuitions, but on available empirical knowledge, so that
they could make legal decisions with better understandings of how law
was working “in action.”
III. GROUNDING LAW IN SOCIETY: TOWARD A
BALANCED REALISM
While pragmatism furnishes a set of philosophical principles from
which socially grounded theories of adjudication could build, legal realism provides a tradition for thinking about how judges could bring
empirical, “real-world” knowledge to bear on the Anglo-American
common law framework. That common law framework is one building block of the search for justice in the U.S. We now consider how a
combination of pragmatism, realism, and respect for textual tradition
can work together in service of justice. Legal realism, particularly in
the big tent form pursued by some of today’s new legal realists, takes
seriously the normative dimension required for translation of social
science in legal settings. In this respect, the movement pushes beyond
mere empiricism (what “is”) to ask how law receives social science
knowledge (what “ought to be” under law). For example, we can ask
how the common law system is actually working in particular places
and times, but then compare this to various normative aspirations of
the law. The effort to balance these different aspects of the common
law system was already evident in the work of the original realists, and
it is coming more to the fore in the work of some new legal realists.
One of the leading original legal realists was Karl Llewellyn, at
times dismissed as a complete skeptic who failed to seriously consider
practice as some have thought, and realists did not trash or ignore formal doctrine to the extent
some have indicated, either.
78. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 172–77 (1921).
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the effect of legal rules on judicial decisionmaking.79 However, Llewellyn did acknowledge that judges operate under some constraints or
“steadying factors.”80 Among these were the impacts of occupying a
professional role with accompanying norms and expectations, the effects of group decisionmaking by judges, and legal doctrine. Thus, by
the end of his career Llewellyn had become concerned about the extent of undue skepticism regarding the effects of legal rules. His concern was that it had created an unbalanced view of appellate judges,
and he attempted to correct for that.81 The balance Llewellyn sought
was partially an attempt to generate a descriptively adequate account
of judging, taking seriously both the effects of operating within a rulecentric system of legal discourse and reasoning, and simultaneously
the realist insight that those rules by themselves were inadequate to
account for the whole complex process under consideration.
We can still hear echoes of Llewellyn’s concern for balance today in
the writings of Brian Tamanaha, a leading legal theorist of the new
realist movement.82 He worries about the effects of skepticism on the
judiciary and on the rule of law:
The threat to the rule of law . . . is not that judges are incapable of
rendering decision in an objective fashion. Rather the threat is that
judges come to believe that it cannot be done or that most fellow
judges are not doing it. This skepticism, if it becomes pervasive
among lawyers, judges, and the public, will precipitate a self-fulfilling collapse in the rule of law.83

Like Llewellyn, Tamanaha points out the constraining influence of a
system of rules and of common law reasoning on judging. He reads
some of the older realist work as attempting to warn judges of the
pitfalls of their prejudices so that they might guard against them, and
summarizes empirical research supporting the idea that even today,
judges do adhere to rules and precedent in many situations.84 Here
we can return to Hernández’s use of empirical studies to identify a
bias in judges’ attitudes; this could be the first step in helping those
79. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 135 (1994); François Ost & Michel van de
Kerchove, Constructing the Complexity of the Law: Towards a Dialectical Theory, in THE LAW IN
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 147, 160 (Luc J. Wintgens ed., 1999); George Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 683, 687 (1998).
80. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 19 (1960).
81. R.H. Clark, Karl Llewellyn on Legal Method: A Social Science Reconsideration, 14 TULSA
L.J. 491, 498 (2013).
82. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW 236
(2006). Tamanaha actually turns to Cardozo for inspiration in describing balanced realism.
TAMANAHA, supra note 2, at 6.
83. TAMANAHA, supra note 82, at 236.
84. Id. at 239–41.
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judges to take conscious stock of unconscious biases so that they could
better adhere to the spirit of the laws they are charged with enforcing.
Along with the effects of professional socialization and professional
norms surrounding legal reasoning, Llewellyn also pointed to the effects of working in groups as a potential constraint on judges. In an
interesting update on Llewellyn’s observation, Adrian Vermeule has
urged jurisprudents to consider the implications of the fact that “reallife” judges are not a monolithic block, but exist as a collective that is
unlikely to adopt any single mode of interpretation, and thus will always be in situations of responding to judges—or trends in judging—
that differ from their own.85 He points out many ways in which the
complications of reality fly in the face of presumptions of uniformity
among the judiciary. For example, while in the abstract, lower courts
are supposed to automatically follow the guidance of upper courts in a
hierarchical system, in fact, lower courts sometimes remain recalcitrant or openly defiant.86 Vermeule’s realist observations invite jurisprudents to pay more attention to empirical work on how different
judges and courts actually work on the ground, in different places, at
different levels of the system, and at different times in history. Here,
those of us who are new legal realists happily recognize a door that
could open between the theorizing of jurisprudents and the empirical
research of social scientists. Social science can help in solving the difficulty of applying rules in new situations where very serious considerations weigh on both sides. These situations are often inescapably
tragic, as to accomplish justice in one sense may in another sense inflict serious harm on someone.
In a recent paper, Curtis Nyquist discusses this inevitably tragic
character of judicial decisionmaking. He suggests that within a realist
approach lies a duty to honor the commitments that Wells described:
“. . . a commitment to be scrupulously honest about the limits of one’s
own particular viewpoint, and, second, a commitment to be genuinely
open to understanding and respecting the viewpoints of others.”87
Nyquist draws on work by Martha Nussbaum and Joseph Singer to
formulate a “conflicting considerations” approach to judicial balancing that he characterizes as consistent with realist thinking:
The Nussbaum/Singer understanding of tragedy captures an essential difference between teleological balancing and conflicting considerations. A judge applying a teleological view of balancing can
85. Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of
Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 561 (2005).
86. Id. at 561–62.
87. Wells, supra note 73, at 1746.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\67-4\DPL409.txt

674

unknown

Seq: 20

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

8-MAY-18

13:56

[Vol. 67:655

slip easily into formalism, separating herself from the result, thinking that the rule decides the case and since the opposed policies
occupy different regions in the force field, a decision one way or the
other does not inflict harm. A judge with a conflicting considerations understanding of policy realizes, as each opposed policy operates throughout the field, she has no choice but to impose harm.88

Of course, legal scholars from numerous schools of thought would
point out that their perspectives take account of the need to weigh the
relative harms caused by differing legal decisions. But Nyquist’s point
is not about which choice a judge makes, but rather about the degree
of certainty, and perhaps of pain, with which that judge goes about
making a decision. In other words, a judge might come to the same
outcome or decision, but do so through a different process, in which
the full range of human suffering at stake is thoroughly and respectfully considered. This again is a call to humility as an important safeguard on the process of judicial decisionmaking.
Some key themes emerge from our brief review of balanced realism. A realist judge of this kind would approach appellate decisionmaking as a search, in the best pragmatist tradition, for the best
available truth in the situation, with full consideration of relevant contexts and norms. Several collegial contexts would provide important
guidance, including: (1) the context provided by the wider community
of judges and legal professionals who together engage in a collective
process that generates precedent and norms for interpreting legal
texts; and (2) the narrower context of the court on which a judge sits,
and within which judges struggle together, sometimes in tension,
sometimes not, to reach decisions. These group contexts are part of
the real world of judging, and they include a set of orientations toward
legal rules that is important. At the same time, realist judges pay their
moral dues by giving full consideration to—indeed, agonizing over—
real world consequences of decisions, not shirking their duty to seek a
deeper meaning in the rules as they apply them with humility, and
serious attempts at openness in Wells (Hantzis)’s sense.89 In performing this difficult balancing act, the realist judge engages along with
others in the community of judges in a collective process that attempts
to generate some stability and continuity while also remaining flexible
enough to do justice in changing times and circumstances.
88. Curtis Nyquist, Re-Reading Legal Realism and Tracing a Genealogy of Balancing, 65
BUFF. L. REV. 771, 851 (2017) (discussing MARTHA A. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND GOODNESS IN GREEK TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY (2001) and Joseph William
Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465 (1988)).
89. And here drawing on social science to broaden perspectives or consider alternative viewpoints can be helpful.
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Finally, if we look back to the original U.S. legal realists, we see that
many of them wound up in public service, working to apply their ideas
as judges or as architects of the administrative state.90 Thus, grasping
how law operates both on paper and in action was a first step; the next
crucial step, for many of them, was to put that knowledge to work for
the public good.
IV. RICHARD D. CUDAHY’S QUIET JURISPRUDENCE:
IN SERVICE OF JUSTICE
What does all this have to do with Judge Richard D. Cudahy of the
Seventh Circuit? It is our contention that his methods of judging and
of being a judge are best understood against the background of legal
pragmatism and as a compelling example of balanced realism. This is
best seen in the following aspects of his jurisprudence: First, Judge
Cudahy had great respect for the appellate process as a pragmatic and
collective search for understanding, in which judges had to balance
applying rules and taking account of the reality within which those
rules had effect. Second, in deciding cases, he was always aware—
sometimes painfully so—of the consequences of any decision in the
real world and how it would affect the parties. Finally, Judge Cudahy
saw law, regulation, and government as potential sources of public
good, when wielded wisely.
First, Richard Cudahy had immense respect for the appellate process and, as Judge Richard Posner has noted, was the most collegial of
judges:
[D]espite our frequent disagreements, our personal and professional relations remained . . . entirely cordial. Judge Cudahy deserves the primary credit. . . . It is not fun to be a dissenter, yet
Judge Cudahy never allowed his feathers to be ruffled. He helped
to establish what has proved to be a durable tradition in the Seventh
Circuit, which is that disagreements are not personalized, and ideological and other clashes, even when they engage the deepest beliefs
of the judges, do not produce anger, rancor, or incivility. This triumph of civility not only makes the lives of the judges more pleasant but also improves the quality of the court’s work.91

It was clear to us as judicial clerks that Judge Cudahy always considered the views of his judicial colleagues as worthy of respect and gave
90. Robert Gordon, Willis’s American Counterparts: The Legal Realists’ Defence of Administration, 55 TORONTO L.J. 405 (2005) (realists involved in administrative law); WILLIAM W.
FISHER, III, MORTON J. HORWITZ, & THOMAS A. REED, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (1993)
(overview including discussions of realists who became judges).
91. Richard A. Posner, A Heartfelt, Albeit Largely Statistical, Salute to Judge Richard D.
Cudahy, 29 YALE. J. ON REG. 355, 362–63 (2012).
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them serious consideration even if he ultimately disagreed. Although
as clerks we were not privy to his conversations with the other judges,
we were constantly exposed to the same qualities of his personality
when we met to discuss cases with him before oral argument. Judge
Cudahy was open to all perspectives and sources of information. He
listened to every point we made or argued. He was comfortable, and
taught us to be, with uncertainty when confronted with the necessity
to make a decision; he could think in shades of grey. He realized that
adjudication at the level of the federal appellate court did not involve
deduction or mechanical application of discernible rules; rather, it required choosing, and he did so with integrity. In the midst of it all, he
displayed trust in the process of appellate adjudication as probably the
best process available to get to the correct results, even if slowly and
by tiny increments.
Although he kept his deeply held religious values separate from his
choices as a judge, his beliefs were apparent in his approach to
others—whether colleagues, clerks, or litigants. Richard Cudahy had
a deep reservoir of principle upon which to draw, in part due to his
Catholic faith and liberal Catholic social theory. For years, he went
on an annual retreat to Gethsemani Abbey in Kentucky and took
other judges with him. Trappist monks did, and still do, operate Gethsemani. The best-known monk from the Trappists at Gethsemani was
Thomas Merton, the poet and contemplative writer whose books
Judge Cudahy often read.92 Merton, who died in 1968, was interested
in non-violence, ecumenical dialogue, and race and social justice issues during the turbulent 1960s. Merton’s social ideals and his vision
of non-violence captures the spirit in which Judge Cudahy approached
appellate adjudication:
Nonviolence seeks to “win” not by destroying or even by humiliating the adversary, but by convincing him that there is a higher and
more certain common good. . . . Non-violence, ideally speaking
does not try to overcome the adversary by winning over him, but to
turn him from an adversary into a collaborator by winning him
over.93

This is a perfect description of the way Judge Cudahy approached colleagues with whom he disagreed, even on matters of deep principle, as
Judge Posner attested to in the quotation above. It also captures the
nature of his persistence in the face of disagreement with one of his
former clerks, a co-author of this Article, in the years immediately
92. Email from Dr. Janet Cudahy, Judge Cudahy’s widow, to Cynthia Grant Bowman (Feb. 8,
2017).
93. THOMAS MERTON, FAITH AND VIOLENCE: CHRISTIAN TEACHING AND CHRISTIAN PRACTICE 12 (1968).
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preceding his death. His former clerk had become involved in the
grassroots struggle to keep the process of hydrofracturing94 out of
New York State, where she lived. Judge Cudahy, a long-time student
of energy policy, disagreed about the wisdom of this environmental
strategy. When he became aware of their disagreement in the course
of exchanging Christmas greetings, he wrote to the former clerk, making arguments in favor of the use of natural gas and hydrofracturing.
On numerous occasions thereafter, when the former clerk checked
her mailbox in rural upstate New York, she would discover formal
envelopes from Judge Cudahy and discover that they contained articles on the subject. This principled disagreement persisted until his
death.
Judge Posner’s tribute contained a statistical analysis which, inter
alia, pointed to the fact that Judge Cudahy’s opinions were heavily
cited by other judges, “a sign of influence.”95 Some of his most heavily cited work dealt with procedural issues, which was not surprising
given the wider reach of procedural opinions across different substantive legal areas—but this was a signal of how well and carefully he
dealt with technical legal questions.96 One of us worked on an opinion with Judge Cudahy which had a basic procedural lesson about the
federal rules governing pleading as its major theme: claimants do not
need to state facts in detail, “nor do [the rules] require a claimant to
demonstrate that proof based on the pleadings will prevail.”97 Reaching this deceptively simple-sounding conclusion required lengthy,
thorough consideration of Illinois law regarding agency, Illinois law
governing negligent misrepresentation, and federal securities law—all
parsed in excruciating detail.98 Upon receiving the opinion, one of the
other judges on the panel commented: “When I first came to the
court, one of our brothers told me that one of the greatest pleasures of
serving on CA 7 would be watching Dick Cudahy tackle a complex
case.” Judge Cudahy conveyed his deep dedication to this craft with
enthusiasm and a dry wit that kept everything in perspective. Thus,
his realism was disciplined by an appreciation and respect for the doc94. Hydrofracking, or hydraulic fracturing, is a process by which vast amounts of water are
injected under pressure into a drilled well in order to release natural gas.
95. Posner, supra note 91, at 357.
96. Id.
97. Rankow v. First Chi. Corp., 870 F.2d 356 (1989).
98. The word “excruciating” captures some Cudahy clerks’ sense of the level at which we
knew we would have to work in responding to our judge’s persistent pushing on details and his
exacting standard for precision. On the other hand, this was a standard to which he held himself,
as he left long workdays with stacks of briefs and showed up the next day with full mastery of the
materials (and MORE questions for his clerks!). As painful as it may have been sometimes to
meet those standards for and with him, one could hardly ask for a better apprenticeship.
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trinal and statutory frameworks within which he took it as his duty to
work.
Second, Judge Cudahy always saw the judicial inquiry as one that
had to be undertaken in light of the consequences for the parties to
the decision and for the rest of society. Each case and each person
should matter. As Wells and Nyquist indicated, a pragmatist approach with deeper ethical roots requires not just superficial review
but a searching examination undertaken with humility. We have selected some cases from our clerkship years to illustrate this point.
One continuing theme in Judge Cudahy’s chambers was the need to
dig deeply into each case, to be sure that no one owed a remedy under
law was neglected. The staff attorneys at the Seventh Circuit, who
were assigned to the court in general rather than to any particular
judge, always knew they could bring cases that troubled them to this
judge. A particularly vexing problem was posed by the flood of
habeas petitions, often submitted pro se, with which staff attorneys
had to deal. It was not uncommon for staff attorneys who thought
they had found a potentially meritorious claim (very rare at the times
we served) to seek out Judge Cudahy for counsel.
LaSalle National Bank v. County of Lake, decided in 1983, involved
the vicarious disqualification of litigation counsel.99 An attorney who
had previously worked as First Assistant State’s Attorney for Lake
County, Illinois had joined a large Chicago law firm which was representing a client in a case substantially related to matters that the attorney would have been privy to through his prior employment.100 After
finding that it was ethically necessary to disqualify the attorney himself from the case based on a conflict of interest, the Seventh Circuit
also had to decide whether all the attorneys in his large new firm must
be disqualified as well. Here, Judge Cudahy was very concerned
about what the consequences of such a wide-ranging decision would
be, in particular, upon the job prospects and choices of young attorneys who might work in government service and later transition into
private practice:
If past employment in government results in the disqualification of
future employer from representing some of their long-term clients,
it seems clearly possible that government attorneys will be regarded
as “Typhoid Marys.” Many talented lawyers, in turn, may be unwilling to spend a period in government service, if that service makes
them unattractive or risky for large law firms to hire.101
99. 703 F.2d 252 (7th Cir. 1983).
100. Id. at 256–57.
101. Id. at 258.
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Judge Cudahy regarded public service as a noble profession but understood its potential long-term financial downside for attorneys with
growing families. Lest talented young attorneys like his clerks become reluctant to work for the government, his opinion advocated for
screening devices, often referred to as “Chinese walls,” which a law
firm could use to ensure that an attorney new to the firm was prevented from gaining any knowledge of or participating in representation involving his or her prior employer.102 If such devices were in
effect upon the date he or she joined the firm, the other members of
the firm would not be vicariously disqualified.103 This had not been
done in the case on appeal, so both the lawyer and the new firm were
disqualified. The Cudahy decision in LaSalle National Bank was influential and has been repeatedly discussed in academic and professional commentary on the subject.104
Another case from that same year, early in the Judge’s tenure, involved facts only too familiar today: the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was seeking to deport a Hispanic man who was
undocumented; he had been living and working in Chicago for almost
a decade, had married, and had two children under the age of three
who were American citizens.105 The Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), which had held a hearing in the case, had already issued a final
opinion denying his motion to reopen the proceedings based on extreme hardship.106
Judge Cudahy and the clerk assigned to the case agonized over the
decision, discussing the impact not only on the life of the particular
man involved and his family members but also on the many others in
that same situation, as well as principles of morality and ethics. The
judicial clerk, who was a single mother, told him about a Mexican
woman whose help with the clerk’s house and young child had been
critical to the clerk’s ability to succeed as a law student. Although
that woman had proper “papers” and thus could work with the approval of the legal system, she had a child whose father was an undocumented worker and the woman worried about the future of her
102. Id. at 258–59.
103. Id. at 259.
104. See, e.g., Craig A. Peterson, Rebuttable Presumptions and Intra-Firm Screening: The New
Seventh Circuit Approach to Vicarious Disqualification of Litigation Counsel, 59 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 399, 404, 408–11 (1984); Samuel R. Miller & Irvin H. Warren, Conflicts of Interest and
Ethical Issues for the Inside and Outside Counsel, 40 BUS. LAW. 631, 643–45 (1985); Polly M.
Faltin, “Agonizing” over Disqualification Decisions: Factionalizing the “Bright Line” Rule in Ex
rel. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Kortum, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 279, 292–93 (1997).
105. Diaz-Salazar v. INS, 700 F.2d 1156, 1158, 1161 (7th Cir. 1983).
106. Id. at 1158.
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son’s father and its effect upon their child. In short, in considering this
case, judge and clerk took into account many sources beyond precedent and law, in good pragmatic fashion. In the end, however, Judge
Cudahy painfully decided that he simply could not overturn the final
decision of the BIA on the basis of extreme hardship (the circumstances were not, after all, unique).107 To reopen the deportation proceedings would not comport with the discretion granted by law to the
court below, and it would do violence to the procedural structure
within which such decisions were to be made. His sadness over this
decision was clear. The day after the argument, Judge Cudahy called
the clerk into his office and suggested that she bring her Mexican
friend and her child’s father to his chambers, so that he could marry
them, thus allowing him to apply to stay in the country.
In short, Judge Cudahy’s insistent humanity and compassion required him to consider each litigant with respect. He discouraged us
from becoming jaded or hurried in dealing with the cases assigned to
us; we were first and foremost public servants who owed an explanation to the people who had come before the Seventh Circuit. Here his
dedication to a shared process of reasoning and accountability as a
core foundation for law became apparent. One of us worked with
Judge Cudahy on a dissent in which he spelled this out:
I write separately to address the problem that occupied most of the
defendant’s brief, and which has been dealt with summarily by the
majority: whether changes between the indictment and the proof at
trial varied or amended the indictment, in this case. This court addresses many claims that we conclude to be without merit; it has
been our custom to state some reason for our conclusions, even if
the reasoning can be summarized in a sentence or two. This procedure seems basic in most cases to the legitimacy of the system.108

Providing a reason and reading the defendant’s arguments with care—
these are ways of ensuring dignity and accountability that produce a
sense that the procedures to which litigants are subjected are just.
And indeed, there is empirical socio-legal research that supports
Judge Cudahy’s observation, demonstrating that providing “procedural justice” can in fact be crucial to the legitimacy of a legal system.109
This brings us to a third and final point: Judge Cudahy saw himself
and his colleagues as entrusted with making decisions that would
serve the public good. Like many of the early Realists, he hoped that
a pragmatic orientation toward the problems posed by law could result in outcomes that served both justice and the public. This concep107. Id. at 1160.
108. U.S. v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1989) (Cudahy, J., dissenting in part),
109. Id. at 1241. See generally TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
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tion of his role was particularly evident in another case decided during
the 1982–83 term, MCI v. AT&T,110 the antitrust lawsuit coming out
of the breakup of the old Bell system monopoly of the telecommunications field. The clerk who wrote the LaSalle National case described above was appropriately and completely walled off from all
knowledge of the MCI case because she had accepted a post-clerkship
position with the law firm representing MCI. Thus, the following
description of the case is not derived from any of her personal knowledge, but is instead based primarily on Judge Diane Wood’s excellent
article in the Yale Journal of Regulation.111 Judge Wood commented
that Judge Cudahy’s background in business and expertise in regulated industries made him uniquely fit to write this complex opinion.112 Moreover, in Judge Wood’s opinion, his antitrust decisions in
general reflected Judge Cudahy’s ability to remain true to the law
while at the same time “keep[ing] pace with the sweeping developments in the twin fields of competition policy and economic
regulation.”113
MCI v. AT&T involved, among other things, a claim that AT&T
had engaged in predatory pricing and had unlawfully failed to interconnect MCI to Bell’s local distribution facilities. After rejecting an
argument that AT&T’s conduct was immune from the antitrust laws
because the FCC regulated its activity, Judge Cudahy focused on
AT&T’s ability to control prices or exclude competition.114 In so doing, he directly confronted the question of the appropriate scope of
antitrust law on a modern regulated industry: whether to focus on economic efficiency and consumer benefit, or on the political and social
consequences of concentrations of economic power.115 In Judge
Wood’s opinion, his own philosophy of the role of the courts and of
antitrust law decided the case, as he wrote:
We acknowledge with approval the populist origins of the antitrust
laws as well as the preeminent role of the Sherman Act as a charter
of economic freedom. But we also believe that, as we have pointed
out, larger concerns about broad pro-competitive policy, economic
concentration and political power have been, and are being at this
very moment, effectively addressed by the regulators, and possibly
by the Congress. Hence, we have tended to believe it appropriate
to focus at this time and in this case upon the specific issues of eco110. MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1092 (7th Cir. 1983).
111. Diane P. Wood, Theory and Practice in Antitrust Law: Judge Cudahy’s Example, 29 YALE
J. ON REG. 403 (2012).
112. Id. at 408.
113. Id. at 405.
114. Id. at 409–10.
115. Id. at 410–11 (quoting MCI, 708 F.2d at 1110).
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nomic efficiency and consumer benefit which are directly
presented.116

As a consequence, Judge Cudahy confined his decision closely to the
facts of the case, applied a “sophisticated appreciation of the problems
of determining real costs” and how to measure them, and rejected
MCI’s predatory pricing theory.117 In doing so, Judge Cudahy was not
only deciding the case on narrow grounds, but was also exhibiting a
preference for a New Deal style of economics and government—not
opposing concentrations of economic power per se, but relying upon
regulation of the large industries, producing benefits to the consumer
by specialized agencies of the modern administrative state, backstopped by judicial review. In terms of pragmatic adjudication, he was
essentially making law in a new and uncharted economic terrain in the
public interest, bringing to bear on his decision his own legal training
and experience both in business and government service, as well as his
own commitment to democracy and its procedures, just as Cardozo
counselled in his 1921 book. Going back to our first point, Judge
Cudahy here also functioned as a balanced realist, bringing to bear the
craft of legal reasoning, taking rules seriously, and undertaking a realist assessment of pragmatic outcomes.
In his approach to the public good, we see also that Judge Cudahy
respected the institutions of the state—in particular the judiciary—
and the need for stability amidst incremental change. This sometimes
led him to defer to precedent or to his perception of the appropriate
role of the courts even when it meant deciding a particular case
against his heart and against the sense of broader justice that resided
therein. We have seen this at work in the discussion of the DiazSalazar case above, where his respect for procedure led him to an outcome that contradicted his personal sense of morality. And yet at the
same time, as in the MCI case, we have seen how Judge Cudahy
shared Dewey’s view of the role of the state as a social organization to
achieve a growing social understanding of an evolving and social subject of study, a process in which the courts had a distinct role to play.
In this regard, he shared common ground with a number of the original Realists who wound up as judges or administrators.
V. CONCLUSION
Benjamin N. Cardozo, quoting Eugen Ehrlich, an Austrian legal
scholar and sociologist of law, declared in 1921 that “[i]n the long run
116. Id. at 411 (quoting MCI, 708 F.2d at 1110–11).
117. Wood, supra note 111, at 411–12.
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‘there is no guaranty of justice . . . except the personality of the
judge.’”118 Our caveat is that the personality of the judge interacts
with his or her legal training to different effects—in Judge Cudahy’s
case, striking a balance between respect for legal rules and procedure
on the one hand, and on the other hand a sincere struggle to achieve
justice in particular situations with the realities of law clearly in view.
This was helped in no small part by his rejection of grandiosity and his
embrace of humor and humility. Judge Cudahy’s balanced realism
placed him at eye-level with those ruled by the law, while always retaining the judge’s role as dutiful interpreter of legal rules as interpreted within a community of legal experts.

118. Cardozo, supra note 78, at 16–17.
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